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The	St.	Lawrence	Seaway	links	central	regions	of	North	America	to	the	Atlantic	Ocean	via	the	Great	
Lakes	navigation	system.		Harmful	non-indigenous	aquatic	invasive	species	have	increasingly	been	










Completion of the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1959 allowed ocean-going vessels through the St. 
Lawrence River, around the Niagara Falls and into the Great Lakes for travel to central regions of 
North America.  Since opening the St. Lawrence Seaway to international shipping, non-indigenous 
aquatic species have increasingly been introduced into the Great Lakes largely through the ballast 
water of international carriers.  The introduction of these harmful, non-indigenous species has been 
hastened by the increasingly larger vessels that require greater ballast capacity and faster vessels that 
enhance the probability of livelihood for the invading species.  Introduction of these non-indigenous 
species has created property loss in the Great Lakes, generated management and control costs and 
altered the ecosystems supporting commercial and recreational activities. A variety of solutions 
have been proposed, with some advocating closure of the St. Lawrence Seaway to ships that are 
involved in transoceanic shipping (Transportation Research Board 2008). 
 Historically, the St. Lawrence Seaway was an important artery linking grain surplus regions 
in Canada and the United States with the world market. However, during the past two decades the 
Seaway has played a more modest role as an export outlet. Regardless, there is concern among 
agricultural interests regarding the implications of closing the Seaway to international carriers. The 
objective of this paper is to develop an increased understanding of forces that have influenced grain 
exports via the Seaway and to offer thoughts regarding the reversal of these forces. This paper 
(1) offers background on St. Lawrence Seaway grain traffic and related geographic grain flows, 
(2) offers a review of relevant literature, (3) employs regression analyses to identify and measure 
forces potentially responsible for the observed trend in Seaway grain traffic, and (4) offers conjecture 
regarding reversal of discovered forces found to be central to explaining the decline in grain traffic. 
BACKGROUND
Trends in Seaway Grain Traffic
St. Lawrence Seaway grain traffic as measured by passage through the Montreal-Lake Ontario 
section reached a peak in 1980, when nearly 26 million metric tons (MMT) transited this section 
(Figure 1).  From 1981 to 1984, grain traffic edged downward to 23.1 MMT and in 1985 declined to 
about 16.2 MMT.  Subsequent to this period, tonnage continued to decline to slightly over 9 MMT 
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during the 2002-2005 period, but in 2006 and 2007 it rose to 11.3 and 10.1 MMT, respectively. 
United States Seaway grain traffic peaked at 13.9 MMT in 1978 before declining to recent levels 
of about 3.3 MMT, while Canadian traffic peaked in 1983 (16.9 MMT) before entering a decline 
to recent levels (7.4 MMT). Historically, nearly 60% of the Seaway grain traffic originated from 
Canada (Figure 1). The data presented in this paragraph came from the Seaway’s annual Traffic 
Reports (St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation various years).
Originating Grain Ports, Logistics and Export Facilities
United States Seaway grain exports enter the Great Lakes largely at the Duluth-Superior port area 
in the western-most portion of Lake Superior, but also through ports in Milwaukee, Chicago, Burns 
Harbor and Toledo.  Duluth and Toledo are now the principal grain ports, handling 66% to 80% 
of U.S. exports via the Lakes (St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation various years). 
The Duluth-Superior grain port hinterland is estimated to extend into the grain surplus regions of 
Minnesota and eastern North and South Dakota, while Lake Michigan grain ports attract from nearby 
areas in Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin. Toledo’s market area is estimated to extend into northwest 
Ohio, southeast Michigan and northeast Indiana.  The U.S. Seaway grain traffic has been primarily 
wheat (40%), corn (26%) and soybeans (24%) (St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation 
various years). USDA data suggest virtually all of the Great Lakes wheat exports originate from 
Duluth-Superior, while corn and soybean exports transship ports at Toledo, Duluth and other Lake 
ports (USDAa various years).    
 Canadian grain exports passing through the Seaway enter the Great Lakes primarily through 
port facilities at Thunder Bay, which is located on the northwest shore of Lake Superior. This port 
area is linked to the grain-surplus prairie provinces of Canada by railroad.  In recent years, about 
80% of Canada’s Seaway grain traffic was shipped from Thunder Bay, with the remaining largely 
shipped through Hamilton, Sarnia, Windsor and Goderich.  Although wheat comprises over 70% of 
Canadian grain exported via the Seaway, important quantities of barley, soybeans, corn, canola and 
flaxseed also transit this artery (St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation various years). 
  Grain exports through the Great Lakes and Seaway are accommodated via several logistics 
schemes. Ocean-going vessels (salties) enter the Great Lakes via the Seaway, load at the above 
identified Lake grain ports and then exit through the Seaway to the open waters of the Atlantic.  In 
recent years, about 40% of Seaway grain traffic was accommodated by this scheme (St. Lawrence 




















































Figure 1: St. Lawrence Seaway Grain Traffic (1972-2006)
Source: St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation. Traffic	Report (various years).
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grain ports by lake vessels to elevators at Montreal and beyond (facilities downriver from Montreal 
and on the St. Lawrence River), as well as in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where salties load the grain 
cargoes for transport to international markets. Some of the salties that enter the Great Lakes are not 
fully loaded at the Great Lake ports because of Seaway limitations and therefore top-off at grain 
elevators located in the Gulf of St. Lawrence at Montreal and beyond. Selected port elevators at 
Montreal and beyond receive grain by railroad, which can transport grain directly from most surplus 
grain production regions in Canada.   
Competing Grain Port Hinterlands and Associated Transportation Corridors
To determine the port area over which grain will be routed, an international grain trader gives 
consideration to origin and destination market prices and the grain transportation and handling costs 
required to link these markets. That routing with the associated port area, which yields the highest 
net price in the origin area, will be selected.  The Gulf of Mexico (Gulf), Atlantic, Pacific and Great 
Lakes grain ports have hinterlands that partially overlap, thus these ports and associated transportation 
corridors compete with the St. Lawrence Seaway and its associated grain transportation corridor.  
 Figure 2 reveals the dominance of U.S. Gulf ports in recent decades as a grain export outlet by 
annually handling over 60% of the U.S. grain outflow (USDAa various years).  Further, the relative 
role of Pacific ports has been increasing over recent decades while the role of Gulf ports has been 
unchanging and the role of St. Lawrence Seaway and Atlantic coast ports has declined. United 
States Atlantic coast grain exports have declined dramatically from about 9 MMT in the early 1980s 
to less than 0.45 MMT in recent years, a shipment profile that partially parallels the St. Lawrence 
Seaway (USDAa various issues). The United States total grain exports grew rapidly during the 
1970s, increasing from about 80 MMT in 1972 to reach a peak of 132 MMT in 1980 before edging 
downward to about 115 MMT in recent years (USDAc various years). 
 United States Gulf grain ports on the lower Mississippi River are estimated to have historically 
received about 90% of their corn and soybeans by barge. It is estimated that the Illinois River 
and upper Mississippi River (above St. Louis) carry about half of the corn and one-third of the 










































Atlantic Gulf Pacific Seaway
Figure 2: Percent of U.S. Grain Exports Via Various Port Areas (1973-2006)
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, Federal Grain Inspection 
Service, Grains	Inspected	and/or	Weighed	for	Export	by	Region	and	Port	Area. (USDAa various 
years).
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70% of U.S. corn and soybean exports (USDAa various years). Because of the efficiency of barge 
transportation on the upper Mississippi and Illinois Rivers, strong competition was likely offered to 
the Great Lakes’ important Duluth/Superior and Lake Michigan grain ports, since these grain ports’ 
hinterlands would appear to overlap with the upper Mississippi and Illinois’ Rivers grain-drawing 
area in the major grain producing regions of Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin. Further, 
Railroad Waybill data shows important quantities of corn, soybeans and wheat in Minnesota, Iowa 
and the Dakotas shipped to Pacific ports, thus suggesting additional overlap between Pacific, Gulf 
and Great Lakes port hinterlands (U.S. Department of Transportation various years). In addition, the 
Atlantic coast ports and associated hinterland are in proximity to the Toledo port area and the Ohio 
River, a tributary of the Mississippi River system, which may compete for grain that could be routed 
to Atlantic coast ports.    
 An examination of U.S. export grain flows via the Seaway and the upper Mississippi and Illinois 
Rivers show markedly different shipment patterns occurring during the period between 1972 and 
2006 (St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation various issues) (USACE 2004) (Figure 3). 
During the 1970s, total U.S. grain exports via the Seaway and the Illinois and upper Mississippi 
Rivers were erratic but trending upward.   However, subsequent to the 1980s, the fortunes of the two 
transport arteries were altered, with grain movement on the upper Mississippi and Illinois Rivers 
trending upward while U.S. Seaway traffic commenced its downward trek.   
 
 United States grain inspection data show U.S. port areas typically serve world importing regions 
that are in nearest proximity to the U.S. port area (USDAb various issues).  For example, during the 
years 2005-2007, about 73% of U.S. grain exports exiting the St. Lawrence Seaway were destined 
for countries that border the Mediterranean Sea (North Africa/South Europe/the Middle East), with 
the remainder destined for north Europe (19%), Africa (3%), South and Central America (3%) and 
East Asia (1%). Conversely, about 90% of the grain exiting Pacific ports was destined for East and 
Southeast Asia, while the Middle East (4%) and Africa (2%) received much of the remaining outflow. 














































Figure 3: U.S. Grain Traffic Via St. Lawrence Seaway and Upper Mississippi (1972-2006)
Source: Seaway traffic is from St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation. Traffic	 Report, 
(various years). Upper Mississippi traffic is from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Final	Integrated	
Feasibility	 Report	 for	 UMR-IWW	 System	 Navigation	 Feasibility	 Study. 2004. Recent upper 
Mississippi grain traffic was supplied by John Carr, Rock Island District, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, Rock Island, Illinois.
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being East and Southeast Asia (40%), South and Central America (28%), countries bordering the 
Mediterranean Sea (14%), other African nations (8%), northern Europe (5%) and the Middle East 
(4%) (USDAb various issues). Therefore, the least-cost routing of grain from U.S. surplus regions 
often involves port areas that are comparatively close to the importing world region. Thus, if a 
particular world region experiences a change in demand for U.S. and Canadian grain, selected port 
flows could be affected.  
 The portion of Canadian grain exports transiting each port area or sector fluctuated during 
the study period (1972-2006), with the St. Lawrence Seaway responsible for over 50% of grain 
exports during the 1970s and early 1980s, trending downward thereafter to comprise about 30% 
of annual outflow since 1990 (Figure 4) (Canadian Grain Commission various years).  In contrast, 
the share of exports by Canada’s Pacific coast ports increased from about 40% in 1972-1984 to 
approximately 60% since 1990.  Also, of increasing importance is the Prairies sector, which includes 
wheat exports to the U.S., an activity that has expanded with the advent of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (Canadian Grain Commission various years, Canada Grain Council various 
years). As noted, transportation rates may influence grain routing through port areas. Therefore, 
it is hypothesized that deregulation of U.S. railroads (Staggers Rail Act of 1980), and possibly 
other transportation modes in the U.S. and Canada, may have altered relative efficiencies regarding 
logistic/transportation systems serving various port areas that provided incentive to alter various 
port volumes and utilized modes. The introduction of unit and shuttle trains subsequent to the 
Staggers Act has made for increasingly efficient rail transportation of grain from Minnesota, Iowa, 
Nebraska and the Dakotas to distant Pacific Northwest ports and may be a force that partially 
explains increased tonnage through the Pacific Northwest grain ports. 
 Doan et. al. (2006) explain that Canada’s changing rail grain regulatory policy and a relocation 
of the geographic pricing point for grain have been important forces influencing the routing of 
Canadian grain.  Since the mid-1980s, Canadian grain transportation policy has evolved from a fixed 
rate structure (Crow’s Nest rates based on an agreement between a railroad and Canadian government 
in 1897) to one where market forces became increasingly central to rate determination.  The Crow’s 
Nest Pass Agreement of 1897 established, in perpetuity, rates on east bound grain movements.  The 
Crow’s Nest rates were an important force linking the grain-surplus prairies to the export grain 





















































Pacific Prairies Seaway Atlantic
Figure 4: Canada Grain Exports Via Various Port Sectors (1972-2007)
Source: Canadian Grain Commission, Canadian Grain Exports (various years), and Canada Grain 
Council, Online Statistical Handbook (various years). 
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losses for the railroads. The Western Grain Transportation Act (WGTA) of 1983 (effective 1984) 
was the first step in reforming Canada’s rail grain transportation.  It allowed rail rates to increase 
gradually, required the Canadian government to provide a subsidy to railroads to cover some of their 
rail costs, and had producers pay about 30% of the grain transportation costs.  However, by the mid-
1990s, the producers’ share of the transportation cost had increased to 50%, and the government 
subsidy to railroads had been reduced.  Provisions of the WGTA allowed for subsidization of rail 
rates for grain but not for processed grain products. As a result, regional grain economies were 
distorted, since grain processors found it advantageous to locate outside of the grain-producing 
region.  In 1995, the WGTA was repealed and replaced by the Budget Implementation Act, which 
eliminated government payments to railroads and the associated regional rail rate distortions and 
required grain shippers to pay full rail transportation costs.  Facing higher rail grain transportation 
costs to export locations, grain production increasingly shifted to feed grains, livestock production 
and specialty crops. Further, the 1989 Free Trade Agreement with the United States encouraged feed 
grain and livestock production, further deterring grain exports in the early 1990s.
 An additional factor potentially impacting the routing of Canadian grain occurred in 1995, when 
the port used to calculate transportation charges to producers (termed the pricing point) was moved 
eastward from Thunder Bay to Montreal.  This increased transportation charges on eastbound grain 
shipments from the grain-surplus prairies (Doan et al. 2006).    
 The review of historic information on geographic grain flows suggests several hypothesis 
regarding reasons for declining grain exports via the Seaway.  These include the relocation of world 
grain import regions for U.S. and Canadian grains, changing grain transportation policies and grain 
handling costs on various transportation corridors, and conceptually changing grain production 
patterns in port hinterlands, which may alter port flows.
  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Makus and Fuller (1987) examined how shifts in location of the United States’ foreign grain 
demands may redirect export grain flows away from traditional transportation corridors and port 
areas.  A multi-period, cost-minimizing spatial model including corn, grain sorghum, soybean and 
three classes of wheat (hard, soft, durum) were featured in a model that included 165 domestic 
production regions, 85 domestic demand regions, 16 U.S. port areas, 43 barge-loading locations on 
two major inland waterways (Mississippi River and tributaries, Columbia-Snake system) and 24 
foreign demand regions. The surplus grain producing regions were linked to grain-deficit regions, 
ports and barge-loading locations by applicable truck and rail rates, while barge rates connected 
barge-loading sites to port areas and barge-unloading sites that were connected by truck and rail 
rates to applicable grain-deficit regions. Ship rates linked the U.S.’ 16 port areas to the 24 foreign 
demand regions.  The spatial model was calibrated to represent region production and consumption 
patterns in the early 1980s and then systematically foreign demand for U.S. grain was redistributed 
among world demand regions to observe the change in domestic grain flows to various port areas. 
Of particular interest was the scenario that redistributed demand away from Europe and the former 
USSR to Asia. These analyses indicated an 80% reduction in European and Soviet Union grain 
demands would reduce U.S. corn and wheat flows through the Great Lakes by about 25%, suggesting 
that relocated world grain demands can influence U.S. port area flow patterns. 
 Hazem Ghonima (1991) examined trends in St. Lawrence Seaway traffic and offered discussion 
for the observed decline in grain, coal, iron ore and general cargo traffic – the primary products 
transported via the Seaway. Ghonima (1991) notes Seaway traffic in the first navigation season 
(1959) was about 19 million metric tons (MMT) (Montreal-Lake Ontario section), with cargo 
growing steadily to reach an all-time record of 57.5 MMT in 1977. With regard to U.S. grain exports 
via the Seaway, Ghonima believes Western Europe’s decline in demand for U.S. grain is a central 
force behind the downward trend in Seaway grain traffic, as is the Staggers Railroad Act of 1980, 
which contributed to the efficiency of transporting grain by rail. Interestingly, in a more recent 
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presentation, Ghonima (2004) suggests that U.S. Seaway grain traffic is favorably influenced by 
steel imports into the Great Lakes because of the backhaul opportunity offered to grain.
 Ghonima (1991) observed that Canadian grain shipments through the Seaway depend on 
world grain demand, primarily in Europe, Soviet Union, North Africa and the Middle East, and 
increasingly grain demand was shifting to Asia, thus unfavorably influencing Seaway traffic.  Further, 
weather and the Western Grain Transportation Act of 1983 were cited as forces impacting Canadian 
Seaway grain traffic. Drought was thought to unfavorably influence exports, and the Western Grain 
Transportation Act may have deterred Seaway exports because of higher rates on eastbound rail 
shipments to Lake ports along with relatively low ship rates on shipments from Canada’s Pacific 
coast.  More recently, Ghonima (2004) cited the (1) disappearance of Canadian grain exports to the 
former USSR in early the 1990s as an important force influencing Canadian Seaway grain traffic and 
(2) the development of unit trains and high throughput elevators with additional grain cleaning 
capacity at Quebec City (export facility on St. Lawrence Seaway) as a force unfavorably impacting 
Seaway traffic. 
 A study by Transport Canada (2007) and other agencies including the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers entitled Great	Lakes	St.	Lawrence	Seaway	Study examined a variety of issues pertaining 
to the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway system, including economic importance, environmental 
considerations, infrastructure and policies (Transport Canada 2007). The study estimates annual 
transportation cost savings of the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway to be $2.65 billion. The report 
also offered potential reasons for the observed downtrend in Seaway grain traffic. They note a variety 
of forces as responsible for the trend, including the decline in demand for North American grain in 
Europe, domestic transportation legislation and technological developments, Canada’s Pacific coast 
port developments, increasing competitiveness in rail rate structures, rationalization of railroad 
infrastructure and associated implementation of unit trains and high-volume inland terminals.   
 Taylor and Roach (2005) examined the transportation “cost penalty” of closing the St. 
Lawrence Seaway to international shipping.  The study focused on Seaway commerce in 2002 that 
was attributed to ocean-going vessels.  Based on collected handling and transportation costs in 2002, 
the annual transportation cost penalty of closing the Seaway was estimated at $54.9 million.  
 A committee selected by the Transportation Research Board (2008) of the National Research 
Council and the National Academy of Sciences was charged with identifying and exploring options 
for Great Lakes shipping that would (1) enhance the potential for global trade in the region and 
(2) eliminate further introduction of non-indigenous aquatic species into the Lakes by vessels 
transiting the Seaway.  The committee concluded that closing the Seaway to transoceanic shipping 
would be a high-risk alternative and would potentially affect the region’s trade opportunities. 
Ultimately, the committee concluded that the preferred strategy for reducing the risk of introducing 
ship-vectored aquatic invasive species into the Great Lakes was technological innovations that kill 
the organism while in the ship’s ballast water (Transportation Research Board 2008). 
ANALYSIS
A myriad of forces may offer explanation for the declining role of the St. Lawrence Seaway as a 
grain export artery.  This analysis focuses on (1) changing import levels by selected world grain 
import regions, (2) domestic transportation legislation, (3) domestic grain production levels, and 
(4) steel imports transiting the Seaway. 
Model Specification
The general form of the estimated equations explaining Canadian and U.S. grain exports via the St. 
Lawrence Seaway were as follows:















is the annual quantity of grain and oilseeds exported through the St. Lawrence Seaway by 
country c in year t, qe
cit 
is the quantity of grain and oilseeds exported by country c to world grain 
import region i in year t, qp
ct
 is the quantity of grain produced by country c in year t, qs
t 
is quantity 
of manufactured iron and steel imported via the St. Lawrence Seaway in year t, and T
t
 is a variable 
representing domestic transportation legislation. Ultimately it was necessary to remove the qp
ct
 
variable (country grain production) from the U.S. and Canadian models because of endogeneity 
and collinearity problems.  This is discussed more completely in the following Empirical Analysis 
section.
 An equation is estimated for Canadian grain and oilseed exports transiting the Seaway and 
another equation for U.S. exports.  Quantity of grain and oilseeds annually exported by a country to 
a particular world grain import region (qe
cit
) represents those grains and oilseeds typically transiting 
the Seaway, and annual grain production in each country (qp
ct
) is for those types of grain and oilseeds 
that typically transit the Seaway.  The quantity of manufactured iron and steel annually imported via 
the Seaway is represented as qs
t
, and typically it is destined for U.S. ports.  Domestic transportation 
legislation (T
t
) in the Canadian equation is represented by a dummy variable that reflects those 
time periods when the legislation is in place and in the U.S. equation as a continuous rail grain rate 
variable. 
 In general, a positive relationship is expected between the quantity of grain and oilseeds 
exported via the Seaway (q
ct
) and import levels of an importing world region (qe
cit
), except when 
port hinterlands overlap and tend to take grain supplies from a competing port hinterland, in which 




. A positive relationship is also 
expected between Seaway grain traffic (q
ct
) and the quantity of grain and oilseeds produced in the 
country (qp
ct
) and steel imports via the Seaway (qs
t
).  High grain export levels are expected to 
be associated with increased grain production (qp
ct
) and vice versa, however the qp
ct 
variable, as 
noted above, had to be dropped from both models because of endogeneity and collinearity problems 
created with its inclusion in the models.  Steel imported through the Seaway is largely destined for 
U.S. ports, and because the steel-carrying vessels seek backhauls of grain, a positive relationship 
is expected between steel imports and U.S. grain exports through the Great Lakes. It is posited that 
deregulation of U.S. railroads (Stagger Rail Act of 1980) unfavorably affected U.S. Seaway traffic, 
as did Canada’s Western Grain Transportation Act of 1983, which increased export rate levels above 
those of the preceding Crow’s Nest era.     
Data   
The dependent variable in the estimated Canadian St. Lawrence Seaway grain export equation is 
the annual quantity of Canadian grain and oilseeds (1,000’s metric tons) transiting the St. Lawrence 
Seaway for 1972/73-2005/06 (Canadian Grain Commission various years, Canada Grain Council 
various years ).   Information on Canada’s annual exports of grain and oilseeds to world grain import 
regions were segregated to include (1) Europe and former USSR, (2) Asia and Oceania, (3) Africa 
and the Middle East, and (4) Western Hemisphere nations.  Information on annual Canadian grain 
and oilseed production was obtained from the Canada Grains Council, Online Statistical Handbook. 
Annual production was collected for Canadian wheat, barley, canola, flaxseed, rye and oats for 
1972/73-2005/06.  Data on annual imports of manufactured iron and steel transported via the St. 
Lawrence Seaway were taken from St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation (various years) 
website. Information on Canadian grain transportation policy was obtained from Doan, Paddock 
and Dyer (2006), Nolan and Drew (2002), and Schmitz, Highmoor and Schmitz (2002).  
 The dependent variable in the estimated U.S. Seaway equation was the annual quantity (1,000’s 
metric tons) of U.S. grain and oilseed exports transiting the St. Lawrence Seaway. These data 
came from the annual Seaway Traffic Reports and were collected for 1972-2006 (St. Lawrence 
Seaway Management Corporation various issues).  Data on U.S. grain exports to world regions were 
obtained from USDA’s Production,	Supply	and	Distribution Database (USDAc various years).  The 
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world regions include:  North Africa, Asia, Europe, former USSR, the Middle East, South America, 
Caribbean and North America. See USDA website for countries comprising each world region 
(USDAc). Data on U.S. grain and oilseed production came from the USDA’s National Agricultural 
Statistical Service (USDA 2007). Data on annual imports of manufactured iron and steel transported 
via the St. Lawrence Seaway was from the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation website 
(various years), and U.S. transportation legislation was incorporated through a railroad rate index. 
Numerous studies have been conducted to examine the effects of the Staggers Rail Act and the 
resulting deregulation, and results have consistently found a decrease in grain rates as a result of 
deregulation (Babcock et al. 1985, Bitzan 1994, Fuller et al. 1987, McDonald 1989).  It is expected 
that the declining real grain rail rates in the post-Staggers era had an unfavorable impact on Seaway 
grain traffic.   
 Based on counsel from the U.S. Department of Transportation (2009) a real railroad rate index 
was computed as a proxy for rail grain rates during the study period with the Rail Freight Farm 
Products rate index (USDA 2009), a nominal rate index collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
and the implicit price deflator from the U.S. Department of Commerce (2009). The Rail Freight 
Farm Products index was selected since a rail grain rate index was not available for the 35-year 
study period, and grain rates comprise a significant portion of the Rail Freight Farm Products index. 
The Rail Freight Farm Products rate index was converted to revenue/ton-mile values with data from 
the Association of American Railroads (2007) and deflated with the implicit price deflator to yield a 
proxy of a real rail grain rate index.  The resulting rail rate index increased from 1972 to 1981-1982 
and then declined about 20% during the post-Staggers era. 
 Figure 5 relates U.S. grain exports to selected importing world regions during recent decades 
(USDAc various years).  United States exports to Europe peak in 1980-81 and then decline, yielding 
a temporal export profile that approximates U.S. exports transiting the Seaway.  Europe was often 
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Figure 5: U.S. Grain Exports to World Demand Regions (1973-2007)
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, Federal Grain Inspection 
Service. Grains	Inspected	and/or	Weighed	for	Export	by	Port	Region	and	Country	of	Destination.	
(USDAb various years).
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as the primary destination.  Grain exports to Asia showed strong growth throughout the study period, 
peaking at 61 MMT in 1995 and averaging about 52 MMT in recent years.  United States exports to 
the former USSR were highly erratic during the study period, ranging from zero to 22 MMT in 1985.
 Canadian grain exports to various world import regions (Figure 6) reveal some similarity to 
U.S. export patterns, with the exports to Europe and former Soviet Union peaking at 14.4 MMT 
in the early 1980s prior to trending downward to average about 2.4 MMT since 1993 (Figure 6) 
(Canadian Grain Commission various years, Canada Grain Council various years). Canadian grain 
exports to Asia and Oceania grew until the early 1990s to peak at 14.9 MMT prior to averaging 
downward to about 9.0 MMT during the past decade.  Canadian grain exports to Africa, the Middle 
East and other Western Hemisphere regions have shown an erratic upward trend until the current 
decade, when a downturn is evidenced. 
Empirical Analysis
Initial model specifications included the following independent variables in each country’s Seaway 
grain export equation: (1) a country’s annual exports of grain and oilseeds to various world import 
regions, (2) a country’s grain production, (3) manufactured iron and steel imports via the Seaway, and 
(4) selected variables to represent domestic transportation policies.  Grain production was ultimately 
dropped from the analysis.  Although a country’s grain production was initially considered as an 
explanatory variable in the U.S. equation, the variable creates endogeneity problems as determined by 
Granger causality testing (Greene 2002) and was not included in the final model.  Further, including 
the grain production variable in the U.S. equation induces collinearity problems. In particular, when 
total grain production is added to the U.S. equation, the average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 
increased to 5.54 from 2.92, while the largest VIF becomes 15.41 instead of 5.69 (Belsey, Kuh, and 
Welsch 1980). Even though the Canadian grain production did not induce collinearity problems in 
the Canadian equation, it rendered the coefficients biased and inconsistent and therefore was not 
included.  The endogeneity of this variable was confirmed with Granger causality testing (Greene 
2002), where all regressors significantly explained the variation in Canada’s total grain production 
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Figure 6: Canadian Grain Exports to World Demand Regions (1973-2007)
Source: Canadian Grain Commission, Canadian Grain Exports (various years), and Canada Grain 
Council, Online Statistical Handbook (various years).
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 The U.S. and Canadian equations were estimated with ordinary least squares, and none of the 
presented models have statistical problems beyond a tolerable level. Specifically, it is concluded that 
the residuals obtained from both equations are independent, homoscedastic and accurately described 
by a normal distribution. Independence was studied by testing for autocorrelation with Portmanteau 
(Q) test statistics up to six lags (Ljung and Box 1978).  None of the Portmanteau statistics-associated 
p-values were smaller than 0.23 for the U.S. equation and 0.82 for the Canadian equation. Therefore, 
the analysis failed to provide evidence of significant autocorrelation.  Homoscedasticity could not be 
rejected using a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg’s test, which yielded a p-value of 0.81 for the U.S. 
equation and 0.15 for the Canadian equation (Breusch and Pagan 1979, Cook and Weisberg 1983). 
Normality was not rejected by a Shapiro-Wilks’ test, with an associated p-value of 0.59 for the U.S. 
equation and 0.18 for Canadian equation (Shapiro and Wilks 1965).  Although the data display 
considerable volatility, none of the observations drive the estimation results. Cook’s distances were 
computed for each observation in both equations. Cook’s D statistics were within the [9.9x10-6, 
0.295] interval for the U.S. equation, whereas they were in the [5.7x10-5, 0.33] interval for the 
Canadian equation, proving to be too small to be considered influential observations (Cook 1977). 
Collinear relationships were studied using Variance Inflation Factors (VIF).  Although the average 
VIF was 2.92 for the U.S. equation, none of the individual VIFs were larger than 6.  The average VIF 
for the Canadian equation was 1.92, with the largest VIF equaling 2.80 (Belsey, Kuh and Welsch 
1980).  None of the accumulated sums of residuals cross the confidence bands to suggest structural 
breaks in either the presented U.S. or Canadian equation (Brown, Durbin and Evans 1975), and 
Granger causality testing (Greene 2000) shows endogeneity is not a problem in either equation.
U.S. Seaway Equation. Table 1 defines the variables in the selected U.S. Seaway equation, Table 
2 is a statistical summary of these variables and Table 3 presents the estimation results. In addition, 
USDA grain inspection data (USDAb various years) show that over 98% of the U.S. wheat exports 
to the former USSR between 1972 (first year of analysis) and the fall of the Soviet Empire in 1991 
were from ports other than the Great Lakes, and in many crop years there were no U.S. wheat 
exports to the former USSR from the Great Lakes.  Therefore, it seemed prudent to subtract wheat 
exports from the other grain exports to the former USSR.  Further, segregating wheat out of the 
USSR variable overcame a multi-collinearity problem that existed with its inclusion. 




U.S. Grain Exports to Europe in year i	(1,000 metric tons) 
 ASIA
i
U.S. Grain Exports to Asia in year	i (1,000 metric tons)
 SOUTH AMERICA
i
U.S. Grain Exports to South America in year i (1,000 metric tons)
 STEEL
i
Steel Imports via St. Lawrence Seaway in year i (1,000 metric tons) 
 RTM
i
Real Rail Farm Product Revenue/Ton-Mile in year i (cents/ton-mile)
 SLS-US
i
U.S. Grain Exports via Seaway in year i (1,000 metric tons)
 USRWHT
i
 U.S. Grain Exports to USSR (except wheat) in year i (1,000 metric tons)
 All variables included in the model shown in Table 3 were significant with the estimated 
equation having an Adj-R 2 of 0.78.   Interestingly, two of the four world importing region variables 
were found to have positive signs (EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA), while Asia (ASIA) and the 
former USSR (USRWHT) had negative signs.  This suggests that the declining imports of U.S. grain 
by Europe was central to the decline in Seaway grain traffic, while the growth in exports to Asia 
tended to offer increased competition to western Great Lakes grain ports through expansion of Gulf 
and Pacific grain port hinterlands.  Further, the analysis shows that the erratic purchase pattern of
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ASIA 1,000 Metric Tons 38,476.71 11,997.35 17,764.00 60,878.00
EUROPE 1,000 Metric Tons 11,538.17 9,818.75 1,469.00 32,388.00
SLS-US 1,000 Metric Tons 5,831.77 2,522.77 2,690.00 13,509.00
SOUTH AMERICA 1,000 Metric Tons 5,409.80 1,744.24 2,334.00 8,891.00
STEEL 1,000 Metric Tons 3,908.77 1,120.50 2,085.00 6,909.00
RTM Cents/Ton-Mile 2.48 0.209 2.07 2.85
USRWHT 1,000 Metric Tons 3,157.83 3,947.68 - 15,800.00
the former USSR and the substantial size of these purchases may have expanded the hinterland 
of Gulf ports at the expense of selected Great Lake ports.  Analysis shows that a 1,000 metric ton 
(MT) decrease in European imports would reduce Seaway grain traffic by 120.9 MT (-1,000 MT x 
0.1209 = -120.9 MT), and a similar increase in Asian imports would reduce Seaway traffic by 162.6 
MT (+1,000 MT x -0.1626 = -162.6 MT) (Table 3).  The comparatively large coefficient associated 
with the South America variable (0.9485) suggests the importance of the Great Lakes as a source 
of South America’s grain imports from the United States, i.e., a 1,000 MT increase in U.S. grain 
imports by South America will increase Seaway flow 948.5 MT (+1,000 MT x 0.9485 = 948.5 MT). 
 
Table 3: Summary of U.S. St. Lawrence Seaway Equation 
Variables Coefficients t-statistic P-Value
INTERCEPT -5555.654 -1.63 0.11
ASIA -0.1626 -4.01 0.00
EUROPE 0.1209 3.59 0.00
USRWHT -0.4404 -4.22 0.00
SOUTH AMERICA 0.9485 5.72 0.00
RTM 4390.386 3.20 0.01
STEEL 0.3965 1.80 0.08
Number of Obs 35
Adj-R2 0.78
 The proxy for real rail grain rates during the study period (RTM) has the expected positive sign 
and is statistically significant, indicating that the decline in rates during the post-Staggers period 
tended to decrease Seaway traffic. In the post-Staggers era (1981-2006), the estimated real rate 
decreased 0.45 cents/ton-mile, effecting a decline in U.S. Seaway grain traffic of 1.975 MMT (-0.45 
x 4390.38 = -1,975.67 MT).  Another transportation related variable (STEEL) measures the effect 
of steel imports into the Great Lakes on backhauls of U.S. Seaway grain.  The coefficient associated 
with the STEEL variable (p = 0.08) indicates that an increase in manufactured iron and steel imports 
into the Great Lakes of 1,000 MT will increase U.S. Seaway grain exports of grain by 396.5 MT 
(+1,000 MT x 0.3965 = 396.5 MT).      
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Canadian Seaway Equation. Table 4 defines variables included in the Canadian Seaway equation. 
Table 5 is a statistical summary of variables included in the Canadian equation, and Table 6 presents 
the estimated equation. All variables included in the Canadian equation are highly significant with 
the estimated equation explaining about 87% of variation (Adj.-R2) in annual Canadian Seaway 
grain traffic.   
 Canadian grain exports to Europe and the former USSR, Asia and Oceania, Africa and the 
Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere are significant and with the expected positive signs (Table 
6).
 Europe, the former USSR, Asia and Oceania have been important destinations for Canadian 
grain.  However, exports to these regions peaked in 1982-1992, with subsequent declines in recent 
years that analyses suggest have been a force behind the decline in Canadian Seaway grain flow. 
Importantly, the analysis shows that a 1,000 MT decline in grain exports to Europe and the former 
USSR decreased Seaway flow 814.6 MT (-1,000 MT x 0.8146 = -814.6 MT), while a similar 
decline in exports to Asia and Oceania lowered Seaway exports a more modest 214.7 MT.  Since 
the majority of Canada’s grain exports to Asia and Oceania exit through the Pacific Coast, the 
general downtrend in Canada’s grain exports since the 1990s may have been partially captured with 
the Asia/Oceania variable.  Canadian exports to the Western Hemisphere, Africa and the Middle 
East have generally trended upward over the study period, thus contributing to increased Seaway 
flow.  Further, the analysis shows the Western Grain Transportation Act of 1983, which is included 
as a binary variable extending from 1984-1994, has a negative sign as expected (Ghonima 2004), 
suggesting this legislation reduced annual Seaway grain flow about 1.26 MMT.  




















Canada Grain Exports via Seaway in year i	(1,000 metric tons)
 WGTA
Binary Variable for Western Grain Transportation Act  
(1 = 1984-1994)
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AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST 1,000 Metric Tons 4,204.46 2,469.06 698.18 10,982.10
ASIA/OCEANIA 1,000 Metric Tons 9,081.51 2,804.91 4,477.04 15,889.80
EUROPE/USSR 1,000 Metric Tons 6,614.63 3,981.56 1,564.84 14,143.40
SLS - CANADA 1,000 Metric Tons 9,500.38 2,685.13 5,572.10 16,167.60
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 1,000 Metric Tons 5,132.76 2,705.10 1,267.66 11,633.90
WGTA (DUMMY) 1,000 Metric Tons 0.29412 0.4624973 - 1.00
Table 6:  Summary of Canadian St. Lawrence Seaway Equation
Variables Coefficients t-statistic P-Value
INTERCEPT 165.9502 0.18 0.86
EUROPE/USSR 0.8146 14.15 0.00
ASIA/OCEANIA 0.2147 3.01 0.01
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 0.2875 2.79 0.01
AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST 0.2117 2.15 0.04
WGTA -1,255.1180 -3.01 0.01
Number of Obs 34
Adj R2 0.87
Findings and Implications of Findings
The findings of this study support many of the hypotheses forwarded by Ghonima (1991, 2004) and 
others as explanation for declining grain traffic on the St. Lawrence Seaway.  Canada’s grain exports 
to Europe and the former USSR were statistically important, as was the Europe variable in the U.S. 
equation that shows declining grain exports to the European region is central to understanding the 
decline in Seaway grain traffic.  For example, during the decade of the 1980s, U.S. grain exports 
to Europe declined nearly 20 MMT, which is estimated to have reduced U.S. Seaway grain traffic 
about 2.42 MMT (-20 MMT x  0.1209 = -2.42 MMT). In the U.S. equation, grain imports by the 
former USSR were included as a separate variable whose estimated coefficient was negative.  This 
suggests the erratic and often large grain purchases by the former USSR tended to decrease Seaway 
grain traffic, because the Gulf port hinterland expanded at the expense of competing hinterlands 
associated with Great Lake grain ports. Similarly, the Asia variable in the U.S. equation had a 
negative sign, which indicates the large and growing exports to Asia during the study period likely 
extended the hinterland of the Pacific and Gulf grain ports into portions of the Great Lake’s grain 
port areas.  In the Canadian equation, grain shipments to the Western Hemisphere were found to be 
a statistically important determinant of Seaway grain traffic: a substantial portion of the nations in 
the Western Hemisphere grouping are located in the Caribbean, South America and Mexico, nations 
that receive most of their Canadian grain imports by water.  In contrast, U.S. grain imports from 
Canada are largely overland.
  The analysis indicates that the decline in real grain rates following the Staggers Act reduced 
U.S. Seaway grain traffic.  Interestingly, the important growth in U.S. grain exports via Pacific 
grain ports during the study period was coincident with rail deregulation (Staggers Rail Act) and 
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the introduction of unit and shuttle trains that ultimately linked regions formerly in the Great Lakes 
hinterland (Minnesota, Iowa, the Dakotas) to the Pacific Northwest grain ports.  Further, the analysis 
suggests that U.S. grain was a backhaul for steel imports into the Great Lakes, and Canada’s Western 
Grain Transportation Act of 1983 had a negative influence on that country’s grain exports via the 
Seaway.  
 Since the analysis suggests declining imports of North American grain by Europe is central 
to the observed decline in Seaway grain traffic, efforts were made to learn about the erosion of 
this demand. The decline in Europe’s demand for North American grain is explained largely by 
the European Union’s (EU) agricultural policies, technology, expansion of the EU and preferential 
trade agreements.  Grain production in Western Europe has climbed steadily over the past 40 years 
due to a combination of new technology, high prices and income support provided by the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union. The CAP was designed to equalize farm and non-
farm income and increase food self-sufficiency. This was accomplished through guaranteed farm 
prices at high levels, protective tariffs and export subsidies for excess production (USDA 2001).
 EU self-sufficiency in grains increased from 86% in 1969 to 118% in 1990.  Interestingly, the 
European Union became self-sufficient in wheat production in 1978 and self-sufficient in coarse 
grain (corn) production in 1984, which are periods when Seaway grain traffic turned abruptly 
downward (USDA 2001).  The EU has become a grain exporter for over two decades as a result of 
subsidies offered through the Common Agricultural Policy.  The success of the European Union and 
the Common Agricultural Policy is evidenced by its growth.  Currently the EU includes 25 members 
that comprise much of Europe. The European Union also features preferential trading agreements 
that create a mosaic of tariffs, quotas and import restrictions that vary among preferred agricultural 
trading partners. The U.S. and Canada are two of only nine countries that have no preferential access 
to the European Union (Cochrane and Seeley 2004).  
 Further, it is likely the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the market-oriented reforms in 
former Soviet republics (15 nations resulting from the fall of the USSR in December 1991) that 
generated important quantities of grain exports from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which have 
influenced the competitiveness of U.S. and Canadian grain in the Mediterranean region, an important 
import region for North American grain. For example, by 2000 the old Soviet Federation, primarily 
the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, were exporting an average of 13.3 MMT of wheat per year (Liefert, 
Liefert, Seeley and Allen 2004). 
SUMMARY
Completion of the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1959 facilitated the introduction of harmful, non-
indigenous aquatic species into the Great Lakes through the ballast water of international carriers. 
A variety of solutions have been proposed to this externality, with some advocating closure of the 
St. Lawrence Seaway to curtail the further introduction of invading species.  Because the Seaway is 
an export grain artery for important grain producing regions of Canada, the U.S. Midwest and north 
Plains, agricultural interests have voiced concern about closure of the Seaway.  The purpose of this 
study was to develop an understanding of the forces responsible for the decline in U.S. and Canadian 
grain traffic on the Seaway and offer conjecture regarding the likely reversal of these forces.
 The analysis indicates relocation of world demands for North American grain is central to 
explaining the decline in St. Lawrence Seaway grain flow.  Based on the Canadian and U.S. Seaway 
equations, Europe’s decline in demand for Canadian and U.S. grain had an important influence on 
Seaway grain tonnage, and the demise of the Soviet Union and its demand for Canadian grain also 
unfavorably affected Seaway grain traffic.  Asian imports of North American grain also had an 
important effect on Seaway tonnage.  The U.S. equation suggests U.S.’ substantial and continuous 
growth in grain exports to Asia negatively influenced U.S. Seaway exports.  It is believed that the 
growth in Asian demand for U.S. grain expanded Gulf and Pacific Northwest grain port hinterlands 
at the expense of Great Lake port hinterlands, and the expansion of the Pacific Northwest hinterland 
Grain Traffic on the St. Lawrence Seaway
66
was partially facilitated by rail deregulation (Staggers Rail Act of 1980) and the introduction of 
increasingly efficient train service that linked Minnesota, Iowa, and the Dakotas to Pacific Northwest 
ports.  The analysis shows the declining real rail grain rates following the Staggers Rail Act in 1980 
were statistically important and had a negative influence on Seaway grain traffic, as did Canada’s 
Western Grain Transportation Act of 1983.    
 The decline in demand for North American grain in Europe is largely a result of the European 
Union’s agricultural policies that have encouraged domestic grain production through increased 
subsidization of production agriculture, expansion of the EU to include grain-exporting countries 
in Eastern Europe, and preferential trade agreements that exclude Canada and the United States. 
Further, the demand for grain in the Mediterranean region (south Europe/north Africa/the Middle 
East) may be increasingly met by Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan and other grain-exporting countries 
that resulted from adoption of market-oriented reforms after the fall of the Soviet empire. Therefore, 
expanding world competition may also offer some explanation for declining traffic on the Seaway.
 It is difficult to ascertain with certainty the relative continuing nature of forces that have affected 
a downturn in Seaway grain traffic. Clearly, the agricultural policy of the EU could be reversed, but 
it is unlikely since the same general policy has been in place over 40 years.  In addition, it is unlikely 
that there would be changes in transportation policies that reverse efficiency gains of North American 
railroads and the apparent increased competitiveness they offer to Seaway grain traffic. Therefore, 
an immediate reversal in trends believed to be responsible for the observed downtrend does not 
seem imminent. However, one cannot conclude that closure of the Seaway to ocean travel would 
be inconsequential to North American grain shippers. Some have argued that economic growth in 
Africa and South America portends increased grain exports via the Seaway, and analysis suggests 
a positive relationship between Seaway grain flows and North American exports to these world 
regions.  Further, even though the Seaway is not a dominant grain transport artery, it represents 
an alternate route that may prove to be of substantial value in case of a national emergency or 
catastrophic event (e.g. Hurricane Katrina).   
 The Transportation Research Board (2008) study concludes that closing the Seaway to 
transoceanic shipping would be an impractical solution to introduction of  aquatic invasive species 
into the Great Lakes. The report indicates that shifting Seaway cargoes to other modes could well 
have an adverse environmental impact, including increased fuel use, greenhouse gas emissions, 
accidents and noise.  Further, the study notes closing the Seaway could lead to reprisals by trading 
partners of the United States and Canada, and closing of the Seaway for a prolonged period could 
raise concerns about the financial viability of transportation assets that may have value in the future.
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